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Abstract 
In considering America's reaction to the Holocaust, scholars must address serious 
charges that America bears some culpability for what happened. A survey of prominent 
historical studies and contemporary documents such as newspaper aIiicles, committee 
repOlis, and other government documents prove America had some knowledge ofthe 
Holocaust, but did little in response. Considering the United States' knowledge ofthe 
situation in Germany, America's restrictive immigration policy in the 1930s makes her at 
least partially responsible for some of the lives lost. Other measures to stop the 
Holocaust, such as rescue, ransom, or bombing attempts, would not have been feasible or 
effective. 
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AccessOlY to Genocide? An Exploration of America's Response to the Holocaust 
In his classic study of the Holocaust, David Wyman argues, "The Nazis were the 
murderers, but we [the United States] were the all too passive accomplices."! Wyman's 
statement lies in sharp contrast to the views of William Rubenstein who claims, " ... no 
Jews who perished during the Nazi Holocaust could have been saved by any action which 
the Allies could have taken at the time ... Hitler, the Nazis and their accomplices--and 
only they--bear full and total responsibility for the Holocaust. .. ,,2 These contrasting 
statements concerning America's responsibility and role during the Holocaust represent 
opposite extremes in historical analysis. Gennany's systematic murder of six million 
people during World War II evokes volatile and emotional reactions even from scholars 
who attempt to study it over sixty years later. Many express understandable feelings of 
shock, horror, and anger that such an atrocity occurred and that the beacon of democracy, 
the United States of America, allowed it. 
When studying the Holocaust, most people rightly declare that no such atrocity 
should ever happen. At times such feelings of shock and anger translate into thoughts 
that the United States and other democracies should not have allowed it to happen and 
could have done something to prevent it. Much recent scholarship on the Holocaust 
agrees with David Wyman in accusing the United States of being a willing accomplice to 
the Holocaust because of its failure to ease its immigration policy, rescue Holocaust 
victims, or bomb the concentration camps. In reaction to this academic trend, histOlians 
such as William D. Rubenstein gravitate toward the opposite extreme and declare that no 
I David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), ix. 
2 William D. Rubenstein, The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More 
Jewsji-om the Nazis (New York: Routledge, 1997), x. 
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change in U.S. policies at the time could have saved any lives. As with most historical 
and ethical questions, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. While both the American 
government and people had sufficient knowledge of Gennan persecution of the Jews in 
the 1930s and the Holocaust during World War II to take action, the only effective 
measure within their power would have been liberalization of ilmnigration policies in the 
late 1930s. Other actions such as rescue or bombing effOlis would most likely have 
failed. 
Before examining America's response to the Holocaust, histOlians must consider 
how much knowledge the U.S. government and public had about the events occurring in 
Gennany under Adolf Hitler's regime. From the earliest persecution ofthe Jews in Nazi 
Gennany to the culmination of the Final Solution, both the U.S. government and the 
American public had access to infonnation about the plight of Gennan Jews, though such 
reports often received little attention. Furthern10re, social attitudes and preoccupation 
with the war meant that the United States failed to recognize the fate of the Jews as 
unique and remained reluctant to take action on their behalf. 
Even in the early years of Hitler's regime, the American public had access to 
infonnation regarding the treatment ofthe Jews. Historian Deborah Lipstadt argues, 
"There was practically no aspect of the Nazi horror which was not publicly known in 
some detail long before the camps were opened in 1945.,,3 The American Jewish 
Committee published a pamphlet in 1933 entitled, The Jews in Nazi Germany, with the 
purpose of educating Am eli cans about the sufferings ofthe Jews under Hitler. The 
pamphlet contained reports of Gem1an effOlis to exclude Jewish culture and ideas from 
3 Deborah Lipstadt, Beyond Belief The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-
1945 (New Yark: Free Press, 1986), 2. 
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society by ridding libraries of Jewish works.4 Newspapers fmiher testified that Jews 
faced discrimination as the Nazis sought to eliminate them fi-om professions such as 
medicine and law and enforced boycotts of Jewish stores and businesses, even shutting 
them down in the name of "hygienic control."s The New York Times included stories of 
Americans who fled Gennany soon after the Nazis took control. Other media outlets 
repOlied that Gennany practiced censorship of all media and secretly persecuted the 
Jews, expelling many from the country, including " ... some ofthe best brains in her 
financial world and many of the best in commerce, medicine, the law and arts.,,6 As the 
situation for Jews in Gennany became worse, Americans had access to infonnation about 
it, but newspapers often ran short stories that were relegated to back pages.7 FUliher, 
most Americans remained preoccupied with the Depression; consequently, news of Nazi 
did not make much of an impression on the average casual newspaper reader. 
In the late 1930s, several events highlighted the U.S. attitude regarding Nazi 
policies toward the Jews. In 1935 Gennany passed the Nuremburg laws with much anti-
Semitic pomp and rhetoric. The laws sought to further separate Jews from the rest of 
Gennan society, denying them citizenship, access to public schools, and the right to 
marry Aryans. 8 The move came the year before Berlin was scheduled to hold the 1936 
Olympic Games. Gem1any's new attacks on the Jews ignited a controversy over whether 
the United States should attend the Olympics or boycott them as a symbol of protest 
against Gennany's policies. Starting as early as 1934 the American Olympic Committee 
4 The London Times, March 27,1933 inAmerica Views the Holocaust, 1933-1945: A Brief 
Documentmy HistOlY, edited by Robert H. Abzug. Boston: BedfordlSt. Martin's, 1999, 12. 
5 Berliner Tageblatt, May 14, 1933 America Views the Holocaust, 13. 
6"German Fugitives Tell of the Atrocities of the Nazis," The New York Times, March 20, 1933. 
7 Wyman, 20. 
8 Newsweek, "Germany: Hitler Decrees Swastika Reich Flag; Bars Intermarriage; Relegates Jews 
to the Dark Ages," September 21, 1935 in America Views the Holocaust, 55-58. 
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sought assurances fi.-om Berlin that non-Aryans would be treated fairly at the Olympic 
Games. While they received official promises of impartiality, reports of mistreatment 
belied Gennan intentions and led Catholic and Jewish groups, labor unions, the New York 
Times, and some Protestant organizations to push for a boycott to condelIDl Gennany's 
cruelty.9 Ernest Lee Jahncke, a Gennan-American member ofthe International Olympic 
Committee wrote, " ... under the domination ofthe Nazi government the Gennan sports 
authorities have violated and are continuing to violate every requirement of fair play in 
the conduct of sports in Gennany ... ,,10 Even though the United States attended the 1936 
Olympics in Berlin, the issue of race would not go away. I I 
In November 1938 the Nazis can"ied out what Louis Lochner called " ... the most 
ten"ible experience in all my life ... the anti-Semitic orgy of November 10 and days 
following.,,12 This event would later be known as Kristallnacht, or the "night of broken 
glass." Nazi party members unleashed vicious violence against the Jews, destroying 
property and beating, raping, and killing those that crossed their path. More than 90 Jews 
lost their lives in the violence. 13 After Kristallnachtmany Gennan Jews gave up their 
illusions about staying in their country and detennined to emigrate, precipitating a 
refugee crisis for Europe and the United States. 
While the Nazis persecuted and at times murdered Jews in the late 1930s, the 
Holocaust, which is the Gennan attempt to systematically eliminate the Jews as race, did 
not begin until at least 1939. Gernlany's invasion of Poland in September 1939 
9 Abzug, 61. 
10 Ernest Lee Jalmcke, "Letter to Count Henri Baillet-Latour," November 25, 1935 in America 
Views the Holocaust, 64. 
II b A zug,70. 
12 Louis Loc1mer, "Letter to Betty and Bobby," November 28, 1938 in America Views the 
Holocaust, 73. 
13 Abzug, 54. 
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inaugurated new policies toward Jews and others who threatened Gennan power that 
eventually led to the Holocaust. Historians debate whether Hitler planned to destroy the 
Jews from the beginning of his regime or whether those plans developed during the war. 
Christopher R. Browning argues that the Nazis had always been decisively committed to 
ending the' Jewish problem,' but they searched for various solutions including forced 
emigration and expulsion before embarking on a course of mass murder which is known 
as the Holocaust. 14 The tactics used in Poland were pad ofthe Nazi search for such a 
solution and provided an early 0ppOliunity for the Nazis to experiment with various 
approaches to their war against 'inferior' races. In Poland, the Nazis defined their enemy 
in racial tenns and used a new level ofbmtality to eliminate the Polish elite that could 
challenge Gennan power. IS The Nazis used the Einsatzgruppen to kill Poland's upper 
classes and ordinary civilians in Operation TANNENBURG.16 The Einsatzgruppen 's 
practice of shooting civilians in Poland set a precedent for the bmtality against Jews that 
occurred on a larger scale when the Gennans invaded the Soviet Union. 17 While Nazi 
policy toward the Jews of Europe in 1939 remained focused on forced emigration and 
resettlement to places such as Madagascar, the tactics used in Poland intensified Gennan 
animosity and violence toward the Jews that would become fully manifest in the Final 
Solution.18 
Despite the activities ofthe Einsatzgruppen in Poland and the Soviet Union, the 
Nazis did not officially adopt the Final Solution until 1942. By this time, Gennany had 
14 Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish 
Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 424. 
15 Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitz!o-ieg, Ideology, and Atrocity (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2003), 227-228. 
16 Ibid., 228. 
17 Ibid., 234. 
18 Ibid., 233-235. 
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already declared war against the United States; thus, Germany had no diplomatic reason 
to curb its cruelty towards the Jews as a means of preserving American neutrality.19 The 
Einsatzgruppen tactics of shooting individuals proved 'inefficient' in the Soviet Union 
and psychologically hannful to the executioners and thus the Nazis believed they needed 
a more effective solution. At the Wannsee Conference in 1942, Nazis leaders officially 
adopted a policy of destroying the Jews as a race through mass murder.20 Conference 
attendees used such tenns "liquidation" and "extennination" to describe their plans for 
the Jews. The only question remaining was the method ofkilling.21 The Nazis 
eventually decided on using tactics they had established in 1941 and began killing their 
victims in the gas chambers of the concentration camps.22 The Final Solution proved to 
be more efficient than previous approaches and quicldy destroyed Jews en masse. If 
prisoners did not die on the marches to the concentration camps fi'om disease, hunger, or 
exposure, the gas chambers that waited for them would carry out their grisly work.23 
Most historians agree that U.S. intelligence officials were aware of some of the Nazi 
atrocities in the extennination camps, though the American public generally had only 
piecemeal infonnation due to sporadic and scant media coverage.24 
While the American government had received reports of severe Nazi persecution 
of Jews based solely on their racial or religious background, it did not receive official 
confinnation that the Gennans intended on eliminating the Jews as a group until late 
1942. Initial reports reached the State Department by August, 1942, but skeptical 
19 Browning, 410. 
20 Ibid., 413. 
21 Ibid., 413. 
22 Ibid., 424. 
23 Abzurg, 109-111. 
24 Ibid., 111. 
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officials requested the infonnation be kept secret until they could confinn it and thus the 
public did not receive the infonnation until November.25 Confirmation of Nazi practices 
came from a prominent Gennan industrialist whose contributions to the Gennan war 
effort gave him access to confidential infonnation regarding the Jews. The businessman 
contacted Dr. Gerhart Riegner, the representative of the World Jewish Congress in 
Geneva, who infonned the U.S. Consulate in Geneva in August.26 Howard Elting, Jr., the 
American Vice Consul in Geneva, sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State in 
Washington, repOliing Riegner's infonnation that the Nazis aimed at killing three to four 
million Jews in occupied territories.27 While Elting could not confinn the infonnation, he 
stressed to his superiors his impression that Riegner was " ... a serious and balanced 
individual and that he would never have come to the Consulate with the above report if 
he had not had confidence in his infonnant's reliability and ifhe did not seriously 
consider that the report might well contain an element oftruth.,,28 Elting could not prove 
Riegner's repOli, but took it seriously enough to encourage his superiors to examine it 
closely. 
Other State Department officials treated Riegner's claims about the Holocaust 
with much more skepticism than did Elting. A separate telegram from Bern emphasized 
that the Legation could not verify the accuracy of Riegner' s report and warned, "The 
report has eannarks of war rumor inspired by fear and what is cOlmnonly understood to 
25 Wyman, 42. 
26 Ibid., 43. 
27 Telegram to the Secretary of State, August 11, 1942. "The American Experience: America and 
the Holocaust" http://www.pbs.org/wgbhJamex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/index.html (accessed 
February 12,2007). 
28 Howard Elting, Memorandum to the Secretary of State, August 10, 1942. "The American 
Experience: America and the Holocaust" 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhJamex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primarylindex.html (accessed February 12, 
2007). 
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be the actually miserable condition of these refugees who face decimation as result [sic] 
physical maltreatment persecution and scarcely endurable privations malnutlition and 
disease.,,29 Mid-level State Department officials dismissed the reports as intelligence on 
the fact that the Gennans used Jews for forced labor, not as a confinnation of genocide. 
The Department also attempted to limit news of related events coming from Switzerland 
in an inexcusable effort to avoid dealing with the issue.3D 
It is impossible to tell how much longer it would have been before America's 
confinnation of the Holocaust became public had it not been for another series of events. 
On September 2, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles received information regarding 
the Holocaust fi'om British intelligence and passed it along to American Rabbi Stephen 
Wise, a prominent Jewish leader involved in both the American Jewish Congress and the 
World Jewish Congress. While Wise attempted to infonn the government and provide 
some help for the Jews, the next months brought few results. Finally, in late November, 
1942, Welles received confinnation of the Riegner repOli from the American Legation in 
Switzerland and granted Wise pennission to publicize knowledge of the Final Solution?1 
In his autobiography, Wise recorded Welles' words to him, "For reasons you will 
understand, I cannot give these to the press, but there is no reason why you should not. It 
might even help if you did.,,32 On November 24, 1942 Rabbi Wise held a press 
conference to reveal the news ofthe Holocaust to the people ofthe United States. 
29 Telegram to the Secretary of State. 
30 Wyman, 43-44. 
31 Ibid., 47-49. 
32 Stephen Wise, The Challenging Years: The Autobiography of Stephen Wise (G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1949). "The American Experience: America and the Holocaust" 
http://www . pbs. org/wgbhl amex/Holocaust/filmmore/reference/primaryl index.html#bar (accessed February 
12,2007). 
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David Wyman provides an accurate summary of the impact of Rabbi Wise's 
announcement when he writes, "From then on, the news of Hitler's plan to amlihilate the 
Jews was available to everyone in the democratic world who cared to know. But those 
not especially concerned were hardly confronted with the problem, because the news 
media gave it little prominence. ,,33 While major newspapers reported the story, only five 
of nineteen major papers featured it on the ii-ont page and two did not carry it at all.34 
The Chicago Daily Tribune's November 25, 1942 edition reported Wise's announcement 
that 4 million Jews had been killed in the Nazis' "extermination campaign.',35 The 
Washington Post's entry consisted of two brief paragraphs and had a skeptical tone. The 
headline ran, "2 Million Jews Slain, Rabbi Wise Asserts" and the article emphasized the 
news as Dr. Wise's claims, rather than confirmed U.S. intelligence.36 The New York 
Times gave more emphasis and sense of urgency to the news of the Holocaust than the 
other two papers. On November 25, 1942, it reported that 250,000 Polish Jews had been 
killed in a scheme to eliminate all the Jews and that Dr. Wise had confinned the 
infornlation. The article's wording was umnistakable. It used tenns such as 
"extennination" and "complete liquidation" in referring to the Nazis' goals for the Jewish 
population in Poland.37 All three of these papers failed to put Dr. Wise's announcement 
on the front page though. The Chicago Daily Tribune reported it on page 4, The 
Washington Post, on page 6, and the New York Times, on page 10. Such limited coverage 
was typical of American media during World War II. News of the Holocaust was 
1942. 
1942. 
33 Wyman, 6l. 
34 Ibid., 6l. 
35 "2 Million Jews Slain by the Nazis, Dr. Wise Avers," Chicago Daily Tribune, November 25, 
36 "2 Million Jews Slain, Rabbi Wise Asserts," The Washington Post, November 25, 1942. 
37 James MacDonald, "Rimmler Program Kills Polish Jews," New York Times, November 25, 
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available, but one had to follow international affairs closely in order to glean the 
necessary infonnation. Jewish newspapers and liberal papers featured news of the 
Holocaust, but the general public often did not read such periodicals. 
Despite meager media coverage, knowledge of the Holocaust slowly trickled into 
the American consciousness and found varied responses. Ben Hecht, an American-
Jewish writer, sought to reveal the atrocities committed against the Jews and impress 
their fate upon the memories of Americans. His piece published in the February 1943 
edition of Readers' Digest recounted the massacre of two million Jews by the Nazis and 
called America to "Remember US.,,38 Such articles increased American awareness and 
help build the case against America's inaction. Infonnation about the Holocaust did 
provoke some response from Americans. In April 1943 the Washington Post reported on 
a pageant staged in Constitution Hall to COlmnemorate the murders of the Jews and help 
push for increased ilmnigration quotas at the upcoming Bennuda Conference.39 Some 
Americans reacted to news ofthe Holocaust with anger and calls for action. For 
example, Freda Kirchwey, editor of Nation, made special pleas for attention to the 
Holocaust using vigorous and impassioned language. She argued that the lack of U.S. 
action constituted complicity with Gennany's brutality. Amelica was as guilty as Hitler. 
She wrote, "In this country, you and I and the President and the Congress and the State 
Department are accessories to the Clime and share Hitler's guilt.,,40 Kirchwey demanded 
increased immigration quotas. The above authors illustrate that some Americans cared 
38 Ben Hecht, "Remember Us," Readers' Digest, FeblUary 1943 in America Views the Holocaust, 
146-149. 
39 "We Will Never Die," The Washington Post, April 14, 1943. 
40 Freda Kirchwey, "While the Jews Die," Nation, March 13, 1943 inAmerica Views the 
Holocaust, 153. 
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deeply about what the Nazis were doing to the Jews in Europe and advocated action 
against it. Unfortunately, their pleas produced few results. 
Modem readers who benefit from hindsight may be tempted to hastily condemn 
Americans for their apathy when they had infonnation available concerning the 
Holocaust. In order to understand the media's limited coverage and the public's 
insufficient interest, one must examine the historical context. When newspapers first 
reported limited news ofthe Final Solution, America was engaged in a total war with the 
Axis countries that dominated policymakers' thinking and the public's attention.41 Rabbi 
Stephen Wise noted to a colleague shortly after a rally in September 1942, " ... in time of 
war it is very difficult to get people excited, generally speaking, about atrocities. All of 
war is basically such an atrocity that it is difficult to move people with respect to special 
atrocities ... ,,42 Americans viewed Gennan behavior holistically and recognized that the 
Gennan government treated all of its citizens harshly, not just the Jews.43 Thus, news of 
Nazi cruelty did not surprise them. The news encountered initial skepticism as well 
because during World War I rumors of Gennan barbarities had been widely circulated 
only to be discredited later.44 People were cautious about jumping to conclusions a 
second time. Further, during World War II, the tenn 'genocide' did not even exist in the 
English language. Most people had difficulty understanding that the German govermnent 
planned to destroy an entire population simply because of their race. Most people 
41 Henry L. Feingold, The Politics of Rescue The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 
1938-1945 (New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1970), xi-xii. 
42 Richard Breitman and Alan Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jew})!, 1933-1945 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 153. 
43 Peter Novick, The Holocaust and American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999), 
26. 
44 Varian Fry, "The Massacre of the Jews," New Republic December 21,1942 in America Views 
the Holocaust, 127. See also, Richard Breitman, Official Secrets: What the Nazis Planned and What the 
British and Americans Knew (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998),8. 
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recognized that persecution ofthe Jews occurred, but could not grasp its scale or intent.45 
While the Holocaust was a unique event, the American public and policymakers failed to 
distinguish it from the other atrocities of war and thus did not give it the attention it 
warranted. 
Another reason for the limited response to the news of the Holocaust was anti-
Semitism in the United States at the time, both among the public and govermnent leaders. 
During the Great Depression, the U.S. govermnent severely limited immigration so as to 
ensure that the limited number of available jobs went to American citizens, not 
foreigners. President Herbert Hoover further ordered the administration to be careful not 
to admit those who might become a 'public charge. ,46 This standard proved instmmental 
in preventing Jews fi'om entering the United States during World War II. The quota 
system favored Nordic or Aryan peoples over Jews.47 Many Americans blamed the Jews 
for the Depression as well, contributing to stereotypes of Jews as linked with 
communism, Bolshevism or economic problems.48 Statistics demonstrate that during 
World War II, many Americans still maintained negative feelings toward Jews. Leonard 
Dinnerstein notes that at this time more than 40% of the American public would support 
or sympathize with a campaign against the Jews, over half would not be opposed to an 
anti-Semitic Congressional candidate, and almost 25% would be more inclined to support 
such a candidate.49 Anti-Semitic organizations existed in the United States, including one 
led by Catholic priest, Charles E. Coughlin, whose popular weekly radio show strongly 
45 Rubenstein, 169. 
46 Henry Feingold, Bearing Witnes: How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust. 
(Syracuse, N.y':Syracuse University Press, 1995), 6l. 
47 Ibid., 6l. 
48 Leonard Dilmerstein, America and the Survivors of the Holocaust (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982),2. 
49 Ibid., 6. 
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criticized Jews. Anti-semitic groups often distributed propaganda against the Jews, 
desecrated Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, and incited fights with Jewish youth in 
cities such as New York and Boston.5o Such hostile feelings made immigration to the 
United States difficult for those fleeing the Third Reich. 
Anti-Semitism is significant to historians examining the U.S. response to the 
Holocaust for two main reasons. First, it helps to explain why Americans reacted to the 
news ofthe Holocaust the way they did. While anti-Semitism is taboo in today's society, 
the fact that people tolerated and even accepted it before and during World War II meant 
that many Americans felt little sympathy for or obligation to help the Jews. Thus, even if 
American media had been more attentive to the Holocaust, anti-Semitism meant that 
knowledge would not necessarily have created action. 51 Second, anti-Semitism made 
rescue and relief efforts on behalf of Holocaust victims politically difficult if not 
impossible. While most people dislike the idea that government officials put political 
considerations over saving lives, historians must recognize the decision-making process 
of actors at this time. Some government officials refused to take action because of their 
prejudice toward the Jews. Other officials who were willing to help had to be careful not 
to give the appearance of special treatment for the Jews for fear of a public backlash that 
would pressure Congress to ban immigration entirely or a ban all assistance for the Jews. 
Thus some leaders concluded that a small tlickle of help for the Jews was the best they 
could do and better than no aid at all. 52 A balanced analysis of America's knowledge and 
response toward the Holocaust must consider political constraints on government action. 
50 Wyman, 9-1l. 
51 Breitman and Kraut, 4-5. 
52 Ibid., 63. 
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In addition to evaluating the inf0l111ation Americans had regarding the Holocaust, 
the historians must then examine what actions the American government and people took 
on behalf of the Jews compared to what was possible. HistOlians often point to three 
areas where different U. S. policies could have saved lives during the Holocaust: 
liberalizing immigration policies, initiating rescue and relief efforts, and bombing the 
death camps or rail lines leading to them. In evaluating each area, one must keep in mind 
important historical principles, especially considering the emotional and honific nature of 
the Holocaust. Today, the Holocaust looms as the epitome of human cmelty and evil; 
thus, modern histOlians often conclude that the Allies should have taken any action 
possible to stop the deadly work ofthe extennination chambers. While that may be tme, 
modern histOlians must be careful not to judge the actions of the past by cun-ent 
knowledge and values. An objective analysis must consider the political environment at 
the time, the focus on the war effort, and the unprecedented nature of the Holocaust. 
Also, before criticizing the United States for failure to take a specific action that could 
have helped victims ofthe Holocaust, historians must prove someone proposed such an 
action at the time and that it had a chance of success.53 Objective consideration of which 
policies were possible and potentially successful is necessary in order to detennine 
whether the United States was a passive accomplice to the Final Solution, a guiltless 
bystander, or stood somewhere in between. 
Henry Feingold echoes the sentiments of many historians when he claims, "The 
visa system [of the United States] became literally an adjunct to Berlin's murderous plan 
for the Jews.,,54 So wide is the consensus that the U.S. immigration policy unjustly 
53 Breitman and Kraut, 2. 
54 Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 296. 
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prevented Jews from fleeing Nazi Gennany that William Rubenstein compares 
challenging this idea to challenging that the earth revolves around the sun.55 While U.S. 
immigration policy erected huge bureaucratic barriers to entry, such as waiting periods, 
cumbersome visa applications, background checks, and requirements that immigrants 
have sponsorship by an American citizen, it is far from certain that changes in 
immigration policy would have saved large numbers of Jews or changed the course of the 
Final Solution. Still, officials should have relaxed immigration policies to save as many 
lives as possible, especially in the late 1930s when Jews could have still left Gennany. 
Before and during World War II, the United States had restrictive immigration laws, and 
the State Department interpreted the laws as nalTowly as possible. A change in these 
policies would have saved some lives, but would not have altered the result of the Final 
Solution significantly. 
Even before the Great Depression the United States severely restricted 
immigration through a quota system and obstmctive policies. From the time Hitler first 
came to power, the U.S. government experienced internal stmggles regarding what its 
immigration policy should be. In 1933, as Hitler's persecution of the Jews increased, 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt expressed willingness to admit prominent Jews into 
the United States as a 'moral gesture.' 56 He charged Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins 
with alTanging for such events. Perkins was sympathetic toward immigrants and worked 
to fill the immigration quotas and admit more people to the United States, but she 
encountered resistance from other departments and officials. Commissioner of 
IImnigration Colonel Daniel MacConnack resisted Perkins' efforts because he did not see 
55 Rubenstein, 16. 
56 Breitman and Kraut, 12. 
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a physical threat to the Jews at the time and worried about employment rates in the 
United States. The State Department also wanted to limit immigration, using such rules 
as the 'public liability' charge and the requirement that immigrants have close relatives in 
the United States who could support them.57 MacCormack also shared a fear that was 
cOlllillon among the bureaucracy that if they filled immigration quotas with Jews, 
Congress would respond negatively and limit immigration even further.58 Thus, many in 
the bureaucracy sought to prevent their policies from attracting attention in order to keep 
Congress and the public from becoming involved. 
In the years illlinediately preceding World War II, President Roosevelt and the 
State Department relaxed immigration quotas. In the wake of Kristallnacht in 1938, 
President Roosevelt allowed nearly 15,000 people from Gennany and Austria who were 
in the United States on visitor's pennits to remain even if their pennits had expired. In a 
press conference on November 18, 1938 he told reporters, " ... I cannot, in any decent 
humanity, throw them out.,,59 The administration also increased the quotas to 40,000 
people per year from Gennany.60 While the change in policy was an improvement, the 
quota was still extremely small considering the number of Jews living in Gennany. 
Complex visa procedures also meant that the quotas remained unfilled. Public opinion 
once again limited U.S. policies. A Gallup poll conducted shortly after Kristallnacht 
showed that most Americans opposed what the Gennans did to the Jews, but 77% still 
opposed admitting more Jewish exiles.61 Still, March 1938-September 1939 was the 
57 Ibid., 12, 16-19. 
58 Ibid., 27. 
59 Jolm Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, 
CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws!?pid=15574 (accessed March 6, 2007). 
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most liberal phase of US. immigration as 20,000 people fi'om Gennany came to 
America. 62 
While outbreak of World War II brought many more refugees to the United 
States, it also increased the State Department's caution concerning who should be 
admitted. Some of the restrictive practices included the 'relatives mle' which held that 
anyone with relatives in enemy territory had to undergo a special screening process that 
could take up to 9 months.63 The visa application fonn from July 1943 was four feet in 
length, front and back, and required each applicant to have two American sponsors. 64 
Additionally, the State Department required proof that the applicant was in 'acute danger' 
before he or she could enter the countly. The danger requirement excluded those trying 
to enter from or through Spain, Portugal and N011h Africa. 65 Otto Frank, father of Anne 
Frank whose diary is now famous, faced the frustrations of American visa policies. In 
1941 he attempted to get himself and his family out of the Nazi-occupied Netherlands, 
but failed despite his connections in America. The fact that the Franks had relatives 
living in Nazi Gennany made it nearly impossible to obtain visas because of strict 
American laws. The Franks were only some of the 300,000 people on the waiting list to 
immigrate to the United States.66 The tragic fate of the young girl, Anne Frank, and her 
family demonstrates the potentially dire consequences of America's tight immigration 
policies. 
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63 Wyman, 127. 
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Additionally, Americans limited immigration out of fear that a 'fifth column' 
would enter the United States. Originally used during the Spanish Civil War, the 'fifth 
column' refelTed to people in Madrid who supported Francisco Franco against the 
Spanish Republic.67 U.S. officials feared that the Nazis might send spies to the United 
States as ilmnigrants. Both State Department officials and the President expressed fears 
that spies might enter the nation as refugees.68 A 1940 Roper poll in Fortune magazine 
showed that 71 % of the American people thought that Gennany had started organizing a 
fifth column in the United States. Media and sensational books fanned public fears and 
contributed to even more restrictionist sentiment. 69 Consequently, the administration 
adopted harsher policies to counter the threat such as fingerprinting for all refugees and 
wiretapping phones of those the Attorney General considered suspicious. 7o While the 
government overstated the threat of a fifth column and law enforcement officials charged 
few refugees for spying,71 the fear such an idea created fuliher intensified the already 
restrictionist atmosphere in Washington. 
If American immigration laws were not already tight enough, enforcement of 
those laws by State Department and other officials kept even more people out of the 
United States and ensured that the government did not fill the small quotas. In particular, 
histOlians have sharply criticized Breckenridge Long, head ofthe Special War Problems 
Division of the State Department and assistant Secretary of State, who had jurisdiction 
over refugee matters. While histOlians continue to debate whether or not Long was anti-
Semitic, he favored enforcing immigration restlictions as nalTowly as possible out of 
67 Breitman and Kraut, 117. 
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fears of a fifth column or Congressional backlash to more liberal policies.72 Long's 
efforts blocked 75% of immigration during the time he controlled policies and also 
prevented funding for organizations such as the Intergovenm1ental Committee of 
Refugees. 73 Long's own words demonstrate his and many other officials' attitude toward 
immigration: 
We can delay and effectively stop for a temporary period of indefinite length the 
number ofilmnigrants into the United States. We could do this by simply 
advising our consuls, to put every obstacle in the way and to require additional 
evidence and to resort to various administrative devices which would postpone 
and postpone and postpone the granting ofthe visas.74 
Based on conversations he had with President Roosevelt, Long believed that the 
President supported his effOlis to postpone the granting of visas for as long as possible.75 
Long viewed himself as fulfilling a vital role in protecting the nation from spies and 
sought to apply the visa laws unifonnly, if narrowly. Still, his personal biases against the 
Jews may have been a factor as he linked communism with Judaism and at one point 
praised Mein KampJfor its opposition to the Jews?6 The practices of bureaucrats such as 
Long often detennined govemment policies as a whole. Even if Roosevelt wanted a 
more liberal policy, his preoccupation with the war and hands-off approach as president 
prevented direct intervention into such affairs.77 Thus, Long and other State Depmiment 
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officials could allow prejudice and fear to influence their application of visa policies and 
prevent immigration into the United States. 
One of the most dramatic examples ofthe deadly effects of America's restrictive 
immigration quotas was the fate ofthe passenger ship the St. Louis. In June 1939 the St. 
Louis sailed from Gennany to Havana, carrying refugees that all had landing pennits for 
which they had paid. The Cubans declared the pennits invalid on May 5 and did not 
allow the passengers to disembark in Havana. The passengers met the same response in 
Miami. After days of waiting and rejection from stubbom immigration officers, the St. 
Louis retumed to Europe.78 The captain found refuge for the passengers in France and 
other European countries. His success proved short-lived though because within a few 
years the Nazis overran these countries and depOlied many of the passengers to 
Auschwitz and other concentration camps.79 For the 937 passengers on the St. Louis, 
nearly all of whom were fleeing the Third Reich, U.S. and Cuban immigration policy 
proved fatal. 
While the St. Louis provides a dramatic illustration of the lives lost as a result of 
restrictive iImnigration policies, changes in U.S. policies would not have saved massive 
numbers of people or altered the course of the Final Solution. In the early years of 
Hitler's regime when Jews could have fled, few were willing to go. Many of them 
resisted leaving their homes and country to live in nations that they considered their 
enemies less then twenty years ago. so Gennan Jews had experienced persecution before 
and thought that Hitler's policies were only temporary and their lives would soon retum 
78 "Topics of the times: Refugee Ship," The New York Times June 8, 1939, in America Views the 
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to nonna1.81 Even when the Nazis put them in ghettos, many Jews did not believe they 
would die, but thought that working with their captors would best ensure their surviva1.82 
Also, more liberal immigration policies would not have saved Jews living outside of 
Gelmany in areas the Nazis would eventually conquer. These Jews had no way of 
knowing the danger they were in and would not have left their homes.83 Also, the 
Holocaust did not begin until at least 1939, so there was no way the United States could 
have predicted the dire need for more immigration in the 1930s. Once the Holocaust 
began, liberalization would have helped few if any Jews because Hitler would not have 
released them. Hitler viewed himself and his nation as fighting a race war where only 
one side could emerge viCtOlious. Once Gennany had officially adopted the Final 
Solution, nothing would convince Hitler to release his captives to the United States or 
any other neutral nation. 84 As Lucy Dawidowitz commented, "So long as he cOlmnanded 
the European continent from the Atlantic wall to the gates to Moscow and Leningrad, the 
fate of the Jews in his gIip depended on his, Hitler's, Will.',s5 A key flaw with much 
analysis on immigI'ation and rescue effOlis is the failure to consider Hitler's reaction to 
Allied policies. Ultimately, the United States did not control the fate of the Jews; Hitler 
did. Thus, while U.S. immigration policies were overly restrictive and changing them 
could have saved some lives, it is impossible to know for sure how many Jews could 
have been saved or whether different U.S. policies would have altered or prevented the 
Holocaust. The number would have been limited. 
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A second general area in which historians claim the United States could have 
helped the Jews is rescue or relief efforts. Historians argue that the United States should 
have attempted to get Jews out of Axis territory or provide relief for those under Nazi 
control. The most prominent proposals include the Transnistria rescue plan, an increased 
role for the War Refugee Board, and sending supplies to the concentration camps. Most 
rescue plans failed to account for the war effort and Hitler's resistance to any interference 
with the Final Solution. 
In the fall of 1942, the Allies encountered one oftheir first and biggest 
opportunities to rescue European Jews. "Transnistria" was an area in southeastern 
Ukraine where the Gennans deported more than 150,000 Jews and placed them in 
concentration camps. The conditions were telTible as the prisoners had little food or 
shelter and suffered from disease, unsanitary conditions, and violence fl.·om the Romanian 
soldiers who guarded them.86 An opportunity arose to aid the suffering Jews when 
Jewish leaders in Romania received an offer to help move 70,000 refugees to neutral 
areas if the Allies provided the funding (approximately $130 perperson).87 Henry 
Feingold argues that Hitler would have allowed the scheme as he was anxious to placate 
the Romanians after the loss of a large part of their anny in Russia.88 While the 
Transnistria plan seemed like a golden 0ppOliunity, there were several problems that 
would have made it unworkable. For one, the Romanians never made a clear offer. The 
negotiations that did take place were not between U.S. officials and Romanians leaders, 
but between the underground Jewish leadership in Romania and several men who 
86 Ephraim Ophir, "Was the Transnistria Rescue Plan Achievable?," Holocaust and Genocide 
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87 Wyman, 82. 
88 Feingold, The Politics of Rescue, 182. 
Accessory to Genocide? 26 
claimed to own the Romanian branch of a Gennan shipping company and wanted to help 
the Jews. There were several different proposed ilIDlligration schemes and Jewish leaders 
could never fully verify their genuineness. 89 The negotiations may have been pmt of a 
Nazi scheme to extort money from Jewish organizations or create struggles within these 
groupS.90 Such an operation would also have hampered the war efforts on two levels. 
First, the Romanians had been fighting with Hitler's annies at StalingI°ad so making an 
agreement with them would have potentially angered America's ally, the Soviet Union.91 
Also the price for releasing the refugees would have been large and logistics difficult 
while there was no guarantee that the Romanians were sincere and the money would not 
have gone to them or the Axis. The biggest hurdle would have been getting Hitler's 
approval for such an operation.92 By 1942 the Final Solution was in full operation and 
Hitler was committed to destroying the Jews entirelyo Considering Hitler's obsession 
with the Holocaust, Feingold's optimism that Hitler would agI°ee is unwananted. 
The Transnistria rescue plan shared problems common to all proposals for rescue 
during the Holocaust. Most Allied leaders and Jewish Americans believed that winning 
the war was the fastest and best way to end the Nazi extennination program. Eleanor 
Roosevelt was known for her humanitarian efforts, and she expressed concern for the 
plight of the Jews, but even she agreed that winning the war provided the best help for 
victims ofthe Nazis. In an overseas broadcast for the Office of War Information she 
stated, "We hope that ways may be found to save as many people as possible, but the best 
89 0mir, 1,5-6. See also, Dawidowitz, 167. 
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way to do that is to win the war as rapidly as possible ... ,,93 The nations had mobilized 
completely for total war against the Gemlans and a major effort to rescue the Jews could 
have compromised the war effort, especially since the Allies felt they were in a race 
against time to prevent the Gennan development of a superweapon.94 Moreover, the 
Allies had nowhere to move large numbers of Jewish refugees as few nations were 
willing to accept them.95 Shipping was tight as well, and until mid-1943 Allied 
commanders considered shipping to be the largest restraint on military actions;96 thus, 
diverting ships to rescue efforts could have been problematic. As previously mentioned, 
any rescue attempts to save the victims ofthe Final Solution ultimately relied on Hitler's 
pennission, which he would not give. Finally, even ifthe United States had been 
completely cOlmnitted to rescue effOlis, she would have failed without the help of other 
Allies, neutral countries, governments-in-exiles and people in occupied countries. U.S. 
leadership in rescue efforts would not necessarily have forced others to follow.97 Factors 
beyond the control of the United States severely limited the prospects for successful 
rescue effOlis. 
EffOlis at rescue became part of official government policy with the creation of 
the War Refugee Board in 1944. After several years of inaction on behalf of European 
Jews, pressure from Congress and the public finally built to the point where Roosevelt 
had to take some action. The result was that on January 22, 1944 Executive Order 9417 
created the War Refugee Board to help aid and rescue victims of the Holocaust. Its 
93 Wyman, 148-149. 
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efforts centered on evacuating Jews from Axis telTitories, using psychological threats to 
convince neutrals or Axis allies to stop cooperating with Hitler, and providing relief 
supplies to the concentration camps.98 While the War Refugee Board did its best, it 
lacked sufficient funds to make a difference and often received little cooperation from 
other departments with the exception of the Treasury Department. 99 U.S. delegations 
abroad worked with the Board as much as possible, with the exception of Spain. 100 No 
doubt the War Refugee Board did some good and saved some lives, but it had little 
power, funding, or time. Historians such as David Wyman argue that had Roosevelt 
created the War Refugee Board earlier, more lives would have been saved. While that 
may be true, such a move would have been politically impossible as improved Allied 
prospects in the war effort partially account for the creation of the War Refugee Board. IOI 
The War Refugee Board made what changes it could to American policies, but an earlier 
or increased role for it was not politically or militmily possible. 
Another possible way in which the Allies could have aided the Jews was through 
providing supplies to the prisoners in the concentration camps. Since rescue policies 
failed or were infeasible, the Allies might have been able to buy time for the victims of 
the Nazis by providing them with enough food and supplies to last until the Allied annies 
could liberate them. Beginning in 1943, the International Red Cross sent aid to the 
concentration camps, and after the creation of the War Refugee Board; the United States 
expanded effOlis to help prisoners, especially Jews. 102 Sending aid to the camps may 
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have been a worthy humanitarian goal, but its effects were limited. For one thing, the 
Nazis alone detennined how much food the Allies could send and who would receive it. 
When the Red Cross first sent in supplies, it could only address specific imnates by name. 
Also, the camps prevented the Red Cross from helping those most in need--Jews and 
'unassimilated' plisoners.103 Also, the Allies wonied that food aid would help the Axis 
militarily. The Gennans could have used the aid to provide for their own populations and 
annies, thus directly helping their war effort or they may have been relieved of the 
burden of providing for the Jews, thereby freeing resources for military use. The United 
States and other organizations did attempt to send reliefto the camps, but their efforts 
were limited by logistics and the Nazi policies. 
The final area in which historians generally agree the United States showed 
complicity with the Holocaust is the failure to bomb the death camps or the rail lines 
leading to them. The first request to bomb the camps came in mid-1944 from Orthodox 
Rabbi, Dov Weissmandel and reached the War Refugee Board on June 18.104 Subsequent 
requests came from Jacob Rosenheim of the Agudas Israel World Organization, who 
claimed that bombing would slow depOliations to Auschwitz and save lives by enabling 
the plisoners to hold out until the Allies could fi-ee them.IOS The War Refugee Board also 
requested bombings, saying that though the operation might not be entirely successful, it 
would signal Allied anger over the camps and possibly save some lives in the future. 106 
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The War Department consistently rejected such requests on the basis that they could not 
spare air power fi'om the war effort and that the fastest way to stop the death camps was 
through defeating Hitler. 107 Since then, historians have condemned the United States by 
using many of the original arguments for bombing: the bombing would have sent a signal 
that the Allies disapproved of Gennany' s actions, saved some lives, and perhaps 
discouraged Axis countries from cooperating with the N azis. 108 The Allies made the 
cOlTect decision in declining to bomb the camps because such an operation faced military, 
logistical, and moral balTiers while offering dubious chance of success at best. 
From a military standpoint, bombing would have diverted key resources from the 
war effort, while risking valuable aircraft and personnel. In the total war struggle with 
Gennany, the Allies had to muster every resource possible to defeat the Axis. Air power 
was vital to this strategy.109 While bombing was proposed in mid-1944, the Allies did 
not control the skies of Europe until August 1944, II 0 so bombing could have diverted 
resources fi'om critical battles. Wyman suggests that using Mosquito fighter-bombers 
would have provided the ideal weapons for bombing, but the Mosquitos were not 
stationed anywhere close to Auschwitz at the time, and their crews were highly trained 
and few in number. III The military could not risk such precious human and military 
assets. 
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From a technical and logistical standpoint, bombing Auschwitz would have been 
impossible. The Allies lacked sufficient intelligence to plan a bombing raid such as the 
location and dimension ofthe targets, their construction, and potential low-flying 
hazards. II2 Planning such an operation would have taken a considerable amount of time 
that the Allies did not have. I 13 The location of Auschwitz also presented difficulties as it 
was nearly beyond the range of the closest Allied bases and would require flying through 
the unpredictably dangerous weather of the Alps. 114 Gennan air defenses in the area 
could have effectively repulsed a low-level attack and destroyed the Allied planes.II5 
Properly targeting the camps would have required perfect visibility and weather which 
was unlikely.II6 In their insistence that the Allies take action against the Holocaust, some 
historians often ignore the military factors involved in planning a bombing operation 
against the camps. 
In addition to the military and logistical problems with bombing Auschwitz, the 
Allied cOlmnanders faced a moral dilemma as well. Even under ideal conditions, there 
was a strong probability that the bombs would fall outside the target area and destroy 
imllate housing or other locations and thus kill the people they were supposedly saving.II7 
Previous bombing raids supported the fear of civilian casualties. An attack on the 
Amiens jail in February 1944 killed or maimed over 200 prisoners, while guards quickly 
recaptured those who escaped.118 In an attack on Gestapo headquarters in Cogenhagen 
on March 21, 1945, the Allies lost four out of eighteen Mosquito bombers, two out of 
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twenty-eight Mustang fighters, and ten ainnen. One bomber crashed into a school, 
killing eighty-three children, ten nuns, and six resistance prisoners in the Gestapo 
building. Advocates of bombing often point out that the inmates were going to die 
anyway, but that was far from certain as many survived the Holocaust. Even if the 
prisoners were going to die, that is hardly a justification for Allied action that would have 
directly caused their deaths. Even the most extreme circumstances do not justify 
intentional killing of civilians and non-combatants to send a signal to the enemy. 
The final consideration regarding the bombing of Auschwitz is the potential 
effectiveness of such a plan. Logistically, Allied bombing would have had little impact 
on the operation of the death camps. Had the Allies bombed rail lines to Auschwitz, the 
Gennans could have used other lines to deport prisoners. Attempts to bomb the railroad 
lines leading to Rome proved that the Gennans had 'redundant capacity' and could use 
altemate routes and quickly rebuild. I 19 Even if the Allies succeeded in destroying the gas 
chambers at one death camp, the Gennans could have sent plisoners to another. 
Bombing the death camps would also have failed to deter the killings. 
Accusations that the United States had killed imnates at the camp as a result of a bombing 
raid would have conupted any signal or moral high ground bombing may have created. 
Bombing also would not have helped the imllates significantly. There was a good chance 
that some ofthem might die directly from the bombing and the experience at the Amiens 
prison proved that the Gennans could quickly recapture the weak and exhausted 
prisoners. l2O Given Hitler's fanatical commitment to destroying the Jews, it is unlikely 
that one campaign would have detened him from continuing the Holocaust. The United 
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States had already put diplomatic pressure on Hitler by passing a resolution condemning 
Nazi war crimes and threatening U. S. retribution. Death of Gennan civilians or soldiers 
made little difference to Hitler. The British had bombed Gennan cities in retaliation, but 
Hitler still launched V-2 rockets at London in 1944.121 Hitler had already demonstrated 
his irrational and calloused behavior. Bombing the gas chambers probably would not 
have changed his attitude or approach toward the Jews. Considering the slim chance of 
success and the likelihood of causing more deaths, the Allied refusal to bomb Auschwitz 
should not be considered a failure, but a wise decision. 
The Holocaust has generated significant academic study and debate. Because the 
Holocaust was so honible and beyond anything previously experienced by western 
civilization, scholars react strongly to it and have difficulty maintaining their objectivity, 
thus producing polarizing opinions. Assigning responsibility for the Holocaust plays an 
impOliant role in attempts to fully deal with it. With regard to the United States, the 
American government and public knew the Nazis were brutally killing the Jews, though 
Amelican media failed to give it sufficient attention. The war consumed most of the 
public focus, and widespread anti-Semitism dampened concern for the Jews of Europe. 
The American public's mindset patiially detennined which policies were politically 
viable in seeking to help the Jews. American immigration policy proved unnecessarily 
restrictive, and liberalization certainly would have saved lives as the St. Louis example 
demonstrates. Still, modification of one aspect of American policy could not alter the 
course of the Final Solution. The United States made some attempts at rescue and relief 
of the death camps, especially late in the war with the creation of the War Refugee Board, 
but the success of her efforts was detennined more by Nati policies than American 
121 Ibid., 175. 
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effOlis. Finally, bombing the death camps would have proven infeasible, ineffective, and 
potentially hamlful to the imnates without significantly hampering the deadly work of the 
camps. Only by over-simplifying the facts can one clearly assign blame for the 
Holocaust,122 but careful analysis concludes that while the United States should have 
modified her immigration policies, there was little else she could do to halt the killing. 
Thus responsibility for the Holocaust lies primarily with its Nazi perpetrators. 
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